Scientific discoveries are the key to new advancements in biology, engineering, medicine and other fields. They may be as simple as the discovery of a new drug or as complex as the identification of ribosome sequences, allowing scientists to see how chunks of genes are translated into proteins within cells. Scientific discovery is an incredibly important and exciting endeavor, one which is constantly being explored and refined.
Several philosophers have developed theories about the nature of scientific discovery. Thomas Kuhn, for example, argues that it is typically impossible to identify the exact moment of discovery, and that it is more generally a matter of changing paradigms rather than finding novel facts and theories. Kuhn’s account is highly influential, although many other philosophers maintain that scientific discovery is still a legitimate topic for philosophy of science while abandoning the idea that there is a logic of discovery.
In the pragmatist tradition, philosophers have also analyzed the structure and cognitive mechanisms of discovery. They have found that the processes of identifying and articulating ideas are more complex and rational than traditional (i.e., syllogistic) logic allows. This has led to the development of non-inferential accounts of scientific discovery, drawing on research in creative thinking under uncertainty, social epistemology, psychological and cognitive studies of human reasoning, and research in heuristic procedures and artificial intelligence.
This issue of Topoi features a collection of articles that explore the many ways that scientific discovery is being conceptualized and practiced, both from a theoretical perspective and from a practical standpoint. The articles range from discussions of some inferential paths to scientific discovery to case studies of heuristic and algorithmic procedures for discovering biological and physical phenomena.
About the Author
