Scientific discovery is a core feature of science. The emergence of new ideas is crucial for the progress of science, and is also central to philosophical debates about the nature of scientific knowledge. Scientific discovery is usually a result of observational and experimental results that violate the expectations induced by an established paradigm. A discovery can be followed by attempts to conceptualize the phenomenon, which may lead to a change in the paradigm so that it can accommodate the phenomenon.
In the 17th century, natural and experimental philosophers such as Bacon, Descartes, and Newton expounded accounts of scientific method that distinguished the context of discovery from the context of justification. These accounts influenced later theories of scientific discovery. However, these accounts were not a sufficient basis for the more narrow concept of discovery as hypothesis-formation that has emerged as an important topic in philosophy of science.
One response to the challenge of the context distinction has been to assert that there is more to discovery than just a eureka moment: it consists in processes of conceiving novel ideas. This approach assumes that there is a rational, analyzable process by which new ideas are formed. Advocates of this approach employ a variety of resources, including analyses of actual reasoning patterns and empirical research on human cognition.
Another response to the challenge of the context distinction has come from sociological studies of scientific practice, which recognize that the occurrence of a discovery is a collective achievement. Sociological theories of scientific practice also acknowledge that the criteria by which facts are granted discovery status are not objective, but depend on a process of negotiation through which “discovery stories” are constructed and certain knowledge claims are granted discovery status.
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